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We apply Becker=s (1983) model of lobbying to show that liberalization of foreign bank entry may result 
from political changes and a fall in domestic bank efficiency caused by lack of competition, which raises the 
costs to domestic banks of restricting foreign bank entry. We also show that in equilibrium, reform may be too 
limited to improve efficiency. We use this model and Data Envelopment Analysis techniques to interpret the 
liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines in 1994. Declines in banking efficiency reduced 
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1.  Introduction 
The financial crises of the 1990s have generated considerable interest in the implications of financial 
liberalization, particularly for financial stability (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, Glick and Hutchison, 2001). 
However, the fundamental questions of when and in what form financial liberalization is likely to occur remain 
unresolved.
1 Moreover, while liberalization is often motivated by the desire to enhance economic efficiency, it 
is not clear from theory whether financial liberalization will consistently achieve such a goal. Indeed, as 
discussed briefly below, the evidence that financial liberalization enhances efficiency is at best mixed.  
To address these questions, we apply a model of pressure groups pioneered by Becker (1983, 1985).
2 We 
show that in the political equilibrium, the extent of foreign bank entry depends on the productivity as well as 
the marginal costs of efforts to restrict such entry. Drawing on work by Sjostrom and Weitzman (1996) we 
extend the analysis to discuss why entry restrictions imply that banking efficiency will tend to deteriorate over 
time, and how the liberalization of foreign bank entry can prevent the deterioration in banking efficiency, but 
only if entry is sufficiently large. We then use this analytical framework to interpret political and economic 
developments around the time foreign bank entry was liberalized in the Philippines in1994. 
To anticipate our discussion and results, we argue that opposition to liberalization was weakened, but not 
completely eliminated, by the assumption in power of a reformist government as well as economic distortions 
and a marked decline in banking efficiency prior to the law liberalizing the entry of foreign banks. As a result, 
a partial liberalization was implemented, in which a limited number of foreign bank licenses was awarded by 
the government, and restrictions on the number of foreign bank branches continued to shield domestic banks 
from foreign bank competition. These restrictions limited the impact of liberalization of the foreign bank sector 
on the competitiveness and efficiency of the domestic banking sector.  
We draw on the interest group theory of regulation (Stigler 1975, Mitnick 1980, Becker 1983, 1985, 
Hammond and Knott 1988, Peltzman 1989) to explain the timing and scope of financial liberalization. In this 
framework, deregulation occurs because changes in economic, technological, or political conditions reduce the 
appeal of an existing regime to its beneficiaries, or the relative influence of the beneficiaries of the existing 
regulations. Among the conditions cited are advances in communications and data processing technology in 
financial markets as well as high rates of inflation (Hammond and Knott 1988, Kroszner and Strahan 2000); 
greater integration of domestic and international financial markets (Frieden 1991, Kurzer 1993, Goodman and 
Pauly 1993, Andrews 1994, Cohen 1996); changes in political institutions (Haggard, Lee and Maxfield 1995, 
                                                       
1  Haggard and Webb (1993) and Rodrik (1996) survey the political economy of reform (financial or otherwise) and 
remaining puzzles. Kroszner (1999) focuses on financial deregulation. 
2  A survey by David Austen-Smith (1997) puts Becker=s contribution in perspective.  
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Lukauskas 1997, Armijo 1999); and crises (Tommasi and Velasco 1996, Haggard and Maxfield 1996, Tornell, 
1998, Aizenman, 1999). 
Other recent theoretical studies focus on why reforms may be delayed or partial. In Alesina and Drazen's 
(1991) war of attrition model, potential beneficiaries delay reforms because they count on other groups 
possibly assuming the burden of liberalization. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that uncertainty about the 
ultimate beneficiaries of liberalization produces "status quo bias." Wei (1997) shows that a gradual reform may 
succeed by dividing the opposition to reforms, while sudden "big bang" reform might not. Dewatripont and 
Roland (1992) show that if reform requires unanimity, budgetary constraints may limit the scope of reform by 
limiting compensation to losers from reform.   
We offer a new explanation for the adoption of reforms, namely market imperfections. In our framework, 
lack of competition reduces efficiency and banks= incentive (and equilibrium effort) to oppose greater foreign 
bank entry. We also go beyond existing studies of the determinants of liberalization to discuss why 
liberalization may be so limited in scope that it does not lead to large gains in efficiency. Our analysis suggests 
a plausible interpretation for the recent experience of the Philippines, which without the impetus of an 
economic crisis, but in a fragile economic environment, passed a law liberalizing foreign bank entry in 1994, 
with apparently limited effects on efficiency.     
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of political influence and foreign bank 
entry, highlighting how economic efficiency may interact with political pressures to ease pressure against 
financial liberalization. Section 3 discusses financial liberalization in the Philippines, and the political and 
economic conditions that influenced the character of the liberalization of foreign bank entry in 1994-1995. 
Section 4 examines the evolution of the efficiency of the Philippine banking sector before and after the 
liberalization of foreign bank entry. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  A model of political influence and foreign bank entry     
Applying Becker=s (1983, 1985) framework, consider an economy with two homogeneous groups, banks 
(B) and their customers (C) which are not banks. The government (in response to political pressures) sets limits 
on the number of foreign banks, in order to transfer resources from customers to banks. To focus the 
discussion, we rule out any entry by domestic banks, which in any case may not possess the technology to 
contribute to improved efficiency along the lines discussed below. The redistributed income is RB, RC for banks 
and their customers respectively. 
We assume that the total cost of transferring resources to domestic banks via entry restrictions is given by
     
  (),1 BB GRR
a a =>   (1)  
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where, without loss of generality, we rely on a specific functional form for the sake of clarity and to obtain 
closed-form solutions. Transferring resources to banks by giving them market power (through restrictions on 
foreign bank entry) involves deadweight costs. These are reflected in the assumption " > 1, which implies that 
the resources used to subsidize banks are higher than the subsidy they actually receive (RB).      
The resources transferred to banks from their customers satisfy the following condition: 
  BBCC nRSnR
ab ==   (2) 
Where the last right hand side term is the amount raised from each bank customer as a result of entry 
restrictions, $ > 1, nC is the number of bank customers and RC  is the resources diverted away from each 
customer. The assumption $ < 1captures deadweight losses, so that the net revenue raised from bank customers 
is lower than the resources taken from them.  
A level of resource transfers is secured by regulating the extent to which foreign banks are allowed to enter 
the market. The extent of foreign bank entry F (which may be the share of foreign banks in the assets of the 
domestic banking system, or in the total number of banks) can be found from the equilibrium amount of 
resource transfers that maximize bank revenue, i.e.: 
  ( ) ( ) *** BBCC FnRnR
ab cc ==  (3) 
Where P(.) is the inverse function of S = ((F) and the equilibrium * is the outcome of the  amount of 
political pressure (derived below) that maximizes domestic bank revenue by restricting foreign bank entry. 
2.1 Political Influence and Pressure Functions 
The extent to which foreign bank entry will be restricted depends on an influence function that reflects the 
pressure exerted by banks and bank customers (other variables, such as cyclical conditions, may play a role as 
well, but we ignore them for the sake of clarity of exposition). We focus on the political behavior of the 
domestic banking group, specifying its influence function as a linear function of pressure from the two groups:  
  12 BBBC nRpp
a rr =+  (4) 
To simplify the discussion, we  ignore pc in what follows. Equation (4) says that resources transferred  (or 
foreign bank entry restrictions) are rising in the pressure exerted by banks.
3 One way of interpreting D1 is to 
think of the government as maximizing a weighted average of aggregate welfare and the interests of the lobby.  
                                                       
3  Equation (2) implies that increased influence by one group reduces influence by the other (zero-sum influence). The 
net influence function for customers can be obtained as the negative of the net influence function for the banks (Becker, 
1983). 
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If a government assigns more weight to aggregate welfare, the value of the coefficient D1 may fall. The 
value of the coefficient D1 may also reflect the outcome of legislative bargaining or agenda-setting.
4 
We model political pressure by banks as follows:   
 
1 ,1,0 BBB pan
kl kl
- =<‡   (5) 
where aB is the effort or spending (per domestic bank) on lobbying or other measures to restrict foreign bank 
entry, 6 measures the productivity of lobbying (for example, the success of political contributions in getting 
candidates sympathetic to restricting foreign bank entry elected), 8 is a free rider effect affecting the 
lobbying group, reflecting the fact that any individual bank would like to pass on the effort of 
lobbying to other banks (Olson, 1965). Free rider problems impose a cost 8 on producing pressure (in 
terms of policing, etc.), the direct effects of which are apparent in equation (5).  
2.2 Equilibrium effort to restrict entry 
Banks exert effort aB in order to maximize their income. The income of each member of the banking sector 
B net of expenditures on political activities is defined by:  
 
0
BBBB YYRa =+-   (6) 
To find out how much spending or effort will be expended on political pressure, we take the derivative of 
income with respect to aB in equation (6) and equate the resulting expression to zero. Using equations (4) and 



















  (7) 
Equation (7) reveals two key (and highly intuitive)  features of the equilibrium amount of effort or 
resources invested in applying political pressure. First, more political effort is invested to curb foreign bank 
entry if such effort is more effective or productive. Thus, 
*
B a  rises with the response of the subsidy intensity 
function to pressure, D1 (see equation 4), and with the productivity of increased effort or spending 6 
(see equation 5). As noted earlier, we interpret the parameter D1 as reflecting exogenously given 
institutional arrangements or characteristics of the policymaker (for example, a reformist chief executive, or the 
distribution of power between the legislature and the chief executive) that influence how effort affects the 
ability to implement an agenda that restricts foreign bank entry. 
                                                       
4  For a discussion of how institutional factors may influence political outcomes see the legislative bargaining model of 
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and the survey of agenda-setting by Rosenthal (1990).  
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Second, less political effort may be invested to curb bank entry when such effort is more costly. Equation 
(7) reveals that equilibrium effort is falling as free rider effects in lobbying efforts (given by the parameter 8) 
and the number of domestic banks increase. We also see that effort 
*





-  at a given subsidy level. In particular, an increase in the deadweight loss 
parameter " has two offsetting effects. The impact effect reduces effort (by directly increasing the denominator 
in equation (7), but the equilibrium subsidy R then falls, so the net effect on effort is ambiguous. To illustrate 
more precisely what happens to the equilibrium amount of effort to lobby against foreign bank entry as 
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  (8) 
In this case the response of equilibrium effort to a rise in " is: 













  (9) 
Equation (9) highlights that equilibrium effort by banks to restrict entry responds to deadweight losses that 
affect the economy at large, not just to terms in the banks profit function (6). Equilibrium effort will fall with a 
rise in deadweight loss if the deadweight loss parameter  " as well as the pressure parameter D1 are 
sufficiently “large” relative to other parameters (the productivity of lobbying effort 6 and the free rider 
effects that weaken lobbying) and the number of banks is “small.” 
Using equations (5) and (7), it can be shown that the variables that influence equilibrium effort influence 
equilibrium pressure in the same direction, so our discussion will focus on effort. Solving for the equilibrium 
amount of pressure by banks (and for banks’ customers, which we do not focus on here), using (4) we can 
derive the equilibrium amount of resources transferred to the domestic banking sector  BB nR
a
. Equation (3) then 
yields the number of foreign banks that will be allowed in, consistent with this equilibrium amount of resource 
transfer.   
2.3 Lower efficiency and Political Pressure 
The coefficient  " > 1 may capture a variety of deadweight losses related to the market power acquired by 
domestic banks. Apart from such deadweight losses, entry restrictions may increase the costs of banking by 
lowering the efficiency of protected banks (or more generally, firms). To illustrate, suppose managerial 
monitoring is imperfect, so some workers do not exert full effort, “free riding” on good workers. Observing 
that a poor worker next to him is shirking, a good worker may reduce his own effort. However, the reverse is  
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not true, so over time average effort falls to that of the poorest worker. From time to time, good workers may 
be hired, but their effort will eventually drop down to the preexisting level. At other times, workers who are 
lazier than existing employees may be hired, dragging down the performance of current workers. Since only 
hires that cause workers to shirk more have an impact, the equilibrium (and worst outcome) is for efficiency to 
fall over time. This is a “prisoner’s dilemma” outcome, formalized by Sjostrom and Weitzman (1996). They 
develop a model in which  “x efficiency” is at less than 100% due to imperfect monitoring, where P is a 
measure (relative to the industry leaders) of the extent to which employees work harder or smarter, take 
initiatives, and so on. They then show how in the absence of competition, labor markets may exhibit free rider 
problems that lower efficiency over time. The decline in efficiency is formally described by introducing shocks 
to their model (or “mutations” that follow  a Poisson process). 
Efficiency declines may be countered by liberalizing entry, which introduces competitive pressures and 
better management. In particular, suppose that the gradually deteriorating domestic banking sector is opened to 
competition with foreign banks that possess superior managerial technology not subject to these free rider 
problems. This can raise the average level of efficiency in the banking sector by inducing domestic banks to 
increase their own efficiency. In Sjostrom and Weitzman’s framework, the impact of competition on efficiency 
depends on the “challenge rate,” or whether the foreign banking presence is large enough. If competition 
effects are sufficiently strong (say foreign bank entry  FF > , where the latter is a threshold level of foreign 
banks) the equilibrium in this model may be of permanently higher efficiency. However if the free rider effects 
are stronger than the effects of competition, then efficiency will tend to decline again. 
One way of modeling these effects is by modifying the bank revenue function, (6) so that inefficiency 
reduces the net revenue from transfers as follows: 
 
0 (1(,)) BBBB YYdXRa d =+--   (10) 
 
where 01 d ££  reflects the proportional loss in revenue transfers to banks that results from inefficiencies 
caused by restrictions on competition and entry, X is the improvement in efficiency that may result from 
foreign bank entry, discussed further below, and d is the deterioration in bank efficiency associated with 
free rider effects in labor markets or other managerial incentive problems (Sjostrom and Weitzman, 
1996),  with *d > 0, while X is the impact on efficiency of foreign bank entry, discussed below.      
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It follows that free rider effects in labor markets caused by an uncompetitive environment, by reducing 
















  (12) 
A decline in equilibrium effort to restrict entry will result in a new equilibrium with a larger number of 
foreign banks. However, such entry will only improve efficiency if the new equilibrium level of foreign banks 
F* exceeds the threshold F . The interaction of efficiency gains, free rider problems and foreign bank entry 
may be described by the following conditions:    
  0,0  if  * Xd dXdXddFF dd =+£<   (13) 
  0,0  if  * Xd dXdXddFF dd >+<‡   (14) 
that is, revenue losses will increase notwithstanding foreign bank entry if entry is below the threshold level 
(equation 13), and fall otherwise (equation 14). 
While equation (10) is fairly intuitive, it can be argued that inefficiencies caused by lack of competition 
may affect not just the domestic banks’ bottom line, but the economy as a whole. For example, poor bank 
management or worker quality may adversely effect other sectors, or reduce investment financing. Under that 
interpretation we could assume the deadweight cost parameter " in equation (2) now depends on two elements:  
  (,) dX aa =   (15) 
where "d > 0 and the conditions under which "X < 0 are similar to those in equations (13) and (14). 
Equilibrium effort to restrict foreign bank entry will then fall as deadweight costs rise due to declining 
efficiency, as long as the deadweight costs are sufficiently large in the initial equilibrium (see discussion of 
equation (9)). 
To sum up, our discussion provides a simple framework for analyzing the political conditions under which 
 the liberalization of foreign bank entry may occur. The analysis suggests that 
1.  Political pressure to restrict foreign bank entry is rising in the productivity and effectiveness of 
resources invested in the production of political pressure, and under certain conditions, falling in the 
marginal deadweight costs associated with imposing such restrictions, as well as in the number of 
members in the bank group (due to free rider effects in lobbying effort). 
2.  Due to adverse incentive effects on worker or managerial performance, lack of competition may 
produce a decline in efficiency in the banking sector over time which, by lowering the profitability of 
efforts to restrict foreign bank entry, reduces political pressure to limit such entry. It is also possible 
that a decline in efficiency will raise deadweight costs.      
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3.  Foreign bank entry is likely to improve efficiency only if it exceeds a threshold that offsets the adverse 
incentive effects. Otherwise, improvements in efficiency may be nil. In the short run, there is no 
guarantee that the decline in pressure to curb foreign bank entry as a result of the rising costs of lack of 
competition will lead to enough entry to achieve a permanent improvement in efficiency. 
 
3.  Liberalization of Foreign Bank Entry in the Philippines 
In 1994, the Philippine government amended Republic Act No. 337, the General Banking Law that had 
governed the financial sector since 1948. The amended law liberalized the entry and scope of foreign bank 
operations in the Philippines.
5 Under the new law,
6 the Monetary Board could authorize foreign banks to 
operate in the Philippines through one of three modes of entry: (i) acquisition, purchase or ownership of up to 
60% of the voting stock of an existing domestic bank; (ii) investment in up to 60% of the voting stock of a new 
banking subsidiary incorporated under the laws of the Philippines; or (iii) establishment of branches with full 
banking authority. The law also stipulates that a foreign bank or Philippine corporation may own up to 60% of 
the voting stock of only one domestic bank or new banking subsidiary. 
Foreign bank participation was still restricted, as the act limited the number of branches that foreign banks 
could establish depending on the amount of capital supplied, as well as aggregate foreign bank market shares. 
Foreign banks were required to remit inwardly, as permanently assigned capital, US$ equivalent of $210 
million pesos at the exchange rate prevailing on 5 June 1994 (26.979 pesos/US$). This entitled them to 
establish 3 branches in locations of their choice. Foreign banks were also allowed to open 3 additional 
branches in locations designated by the Monetary Board by remitting additional permanently assigned capital 
in US dollars, the equivalent of 35 million pesos at the same rate of 26.979 pesos/US$. In addition, a foreign 
bank branch was allowed to operate under expanded commercial banking authority if inter alia it had a 
minimum capital of Pesos 2.5 billion, consisting of permanently assigned capital plus “net due to head office, 
branches and subsidiaries and offices outside the Philippines” not to exceed 3 times the amount of permanently 
assigned capital. Moreover, the act stipulated that the Monetary Board “ensure that at all times the control of 
70% of the resources or assets of the entire banking system is held by domestic banks which are at least 
majority-owned by Filipinos.”
7 
                                                       
5 For recent discussions of financial liberalization in the Philippines, see Paderanga (1996) and Intal and Llanto (1998). 
Tan (1998) discusses broader trends in economic liberalization in the Philippines. 
6 “The General Banking Act” (Republic Act No. 337 as amended) and “Addendum” (Republic Act No. 7721). 
 
7 Republic Act No. 7721, Sec. 3.  
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The guidelines for selection of foreign banks were outlined in a central bank circular.
8 A foreign bank had 
to rank among the top 150 banks in the world or the top 5 in its country of origin. Representation from 
different parts of the world was also a consideration.    
Foreign banks reacted quickly to the opportunities presented them by the new General Banking Act. In 
September 1994, 26 banks expressed their interest in entering the Philippine financial market.Ultimately, the 
Monetary Board granted licenses to 10 foreign banks and seven new locally incorporated foreign bank 
subsidiaries.  
Two questions are of particular interest in examining this episode of liberalization. First, what determined 
its timing and scope? Second, was liberalization sufficiently broad to enhance economic efficiency? Equation 
(11) of our analytical framework suggests that we look at factors that may have influenced the intensity of 
political pressures and the productivity of efforts at generating such pressure, on the one hand, and the costs 
associated with restricting foreign bank entry on the other. In the remainder of this section, we informally 
describe developments that may have affected the political feasibility of liberalization. We argue that the 
effectiveness of political pressures to curb financial liberalization fell, while the costs of restricting foreign 
bank entry rose.  
3.1 The timing and scope of foreign bank entry liberalization 
In the Philippine context, the effectiveness of political pressures to curb financial liberalization reflects the 
ability to influence the executive branch and the legislature, and the interaction between these two bodies. The 
effectiveness of lobbying to restrict foreign bank entry was weakened by the 1992 election of Fidel Ramos as 
president. In an environment of increasing political stability, Ramos was in a position to accelerate reforms that 
had been initiated by his predecessor, Corazon Aquino and chose as the major goal of his administration 
bringing the country up to the rank of “Asian tiger”. Because the Philippine constitution limits presidents to a 
single six-year term, Ramos’ legacy depended on his success in reaching this goal. 
Ramos’ pro-reform platform was motivated by a variety of distortions that had adverse effects on economic 
activity, including lack of competition in banking.
9 The economy Ramos inherited was growing below 
potential, partly because a debt crisis in the early 1980s had saddled the economy with a large external debt 
service burden. In this context, foreign bank entry liberalization could boost growth by attracting foreign 
capital, or investments by foreign multinational clients of foreign banks that might otherwise not occur. Ramos 
also saw financial reform as a means to “bring down the old economic order,” a view reflected in an ADB 
                                                       
8  Bangko Sentral Circular No. 21 “Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7721.” 
9  Fidel V. Ramos “Philippines 2000," (speech before the First Multisectoral Forum on Science and Technology,  Manila, 
Philippines, January 21, 1993) in Ramos (1998). 
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report that concluded that “Banking cartels in the Philippines [had to] be dismantled if economic growth [was] 
to be sustained.” Then central bank governor Gabriel Singson further clarified the rationale for liberalization: 
“...the main purpose of this law [is] first the promotion of investment and trade, secondly the development of 
new innovative banking products and the expertise that may be provided by foreign banks, and thirdly to 
promote healthy competition among the banks.” (Euromoney, 1994.)         
Financial liberalization was also advocated by international organizations like the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The IMF made financial 
liberalization a condition for access to a US$ 650 million credit facility. Passage of the new banking bill would 
also signal that the Philippine government was committed to structural reforms advocated by a joint IMF-
World Bank mission as early as 1979 (World Bank/IMF, 1979). Access to the IMF facility was also expected 
to encourage the “Paris Club” of aid donor countries to reschedule loans which were falling due. The debt 
service savings from this rescheduling was estimated to be US$ 1 billion per year (Tiglao, 1994b). 
While Ramos’ accession to power led to further financial liberalization, he was not able to fully implement 
his agenda. The new banking bill was subject to significant restrictions because congressional approval was 
required, and the domestic banking sector, which favored the maintenance of some entry restrictions, was well 
represented in the Philippine Congress.  
As the proposed bills moved through the Congress, the upper house, the Senate, appeared to hold views 
more closely in line with the domestic banking sector. The House version allowed foreign bankers to open full-
service branches and/or wholly-owned locally incorporated subsidiaries. It did not place limits on the number 
of foreign banks to be licensed, nor required foreign banks to inwardly remit their permanently assigned capital 
and convert it into pesos. The Senate version was more conservative. It allowed foreign banks to enter the 
domestic financial market in only one of the two modes, and it limited foreign equity in locally incorporated 
subsidiaries to 60%. The Senate version specifically limited the number of licenses to be granted to foreign 
bank branches to eight. It also stipulated that Philippine companies be allowed to own up to 60% of any 
domestic bank. The previous law limited any single Philippine company’s equity in a domestic bank to 30%. 
Finally, the Senate version required that foreign banks convert their permanently assigned capital into pesos. 
As the head of the Bankers Association of the Philippines argued: “[the Senate bill] strikes a balance between 
the need for opening up the industry to competition on the one hand, and on the other, the need for ensuring 
that banking will not be dominated by foreigners.” (Tiglao, 1994a).       
Ultimately, the General Banking Act of 1994 resembled more closely the Senate version rather than that of 
the House. It was a “grand compromise” of two positions: that of an executive committed to an economic 
liberalization program that included increasing the presence foreign banks, and that of the domestic bank 
industry, well represented in the Senate, which accepted more foreign bank entry, albeit more limited in scope.   
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Why did Senate proposals allow for any liberalization at all?  Apart from political factors, our theoretical 
analysis suggests that lack of competition in the domestic banking sector would lower efficiency and 
opposition to foreign bank entry. This explanation is supported by our analysis of the efficiency of the 
Philippine banking sector, reported in the next section. As will be shown efficiency declined in the period 
before foreign bank entry was liberalized. 
4.  Foreign Bank Entry in the Philippines: Competitiveness and Efficiency 
In this section, we examine indicators of efficiency in the Philippines by drawing on data from Fitch 
Bankscope, which consists of balance sheets and income statements culled from the annual reports of financial 
institutions over the period 1992-1999. The Bankscope commercial bank dataset for the Philippines covers 
only domestic commercial banks (“expanded” or universal banks, and “non-expanded” or traditional 
commercial banks) and four foreign bank subsidiaries (Chinatrust Philippines, Dao Heng Bank, DBS Bank 
Philippines, and United Overseas Bank Philippines).
10 The number of banks covered ranges from 17 to 33, 
depending on the year. 
4.1 Bank competitiveness, efficiency and DEA 
Recent work on the impact of foreign bank entry on the Philippine financial system suggests that the 
effects on competitiveness have been limited, in spite of apparent increases in the share of foreign banks in 
total assets. Manzano and Neri (2000) report that the share of foreign banks in total assets increased from 11 
percent in 1995 to about 15 percent in 1999, with the share of new foreign banks rising from nearly 2 percent 
to over 5 percent over the same period. However, there is little evidence that domestic banks were subject to 
more intense competitive pressures. The annual average spread between lending and deposit rates in the pre-
liberalization period from 1991-94 was 4.7 per cent, not much higher than an annual average of 4.4 per cent 
during the post-liberalization period 1995-97. Neither is greater competitive pressure apparent from measures 
of market concentration (Milo, 2000). 
Apart from affecting loan spreads or market concentration, foreign bank entry—if truly effective in 
intensifying competition—should spur domestic banks to increase their efficiency in order to improve their 
position vis-à-vis foreign banks. To address this question, we apply an analytical tool known as Data 
                                                       
10 Data on four pre-existing foreign bank branches (Bank of America, Citibank, N.A., Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation and Standard Chartered Bank) and nine new full service branches established as a result of the 
liberalization of foreign bank entry (ANZ Banking Group, Ltd., Bangkok Bank Public, Co., Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubisihi, Ltd., Chase Manhattan Bank, Deutsche Bank, Fuji Bank, ING Bank, International Commercial Bank of 
China, Korea Exchange Bank), are not included in the Bankscope dataset. 
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Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a non-parametric programming method that allows the identification of 
the production frontier of the banking sector, and where individual banks stand in relation to the frontier. 
The DEA method finds, for any given bank, the weights that maximize the following ratio of weighted 
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  (17) 
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where yt is the amount of output t, xi is the amount of input i, and the ut , ?i are weights for the corresponding 
outputs and inputs determined optimally by the data for each individual bank.  
The maximization is subject to the constraints that the ratio of “virtual outputs” to “virtual inputs” for each 
bank should not exceed 1 (any bank whose ratio is 1 is on the efficient production possibility frontier), and that 
the weights be non-negative. This specification, known as CCR (after Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) 
assumes constant returns to scale. For technical reasons, DEA does not solve the fractional programming 
problem (12)-(14). Instead, an equivalent two-step linear programming problem is solved (Cooper, Seiford and 
Tone, 2000, Chapters 2 and 3). 
To apply DEA we need to specify outputs and inputs for the Philippine banking sector. We focus on two 
aspects of bank efficiency, deposit production, and intermediation, or the transformation of these deposits into 
loans and investments . In the production stage we define as outputs deposits and other operating income 
(which may capture income from activities not related to bank intermediation) and as inputs equity capital, 
personnel expenses and interest paid. In the intermediation stage we define as outputs loans and bank income 
(the sum of interest income and other operating income) and as inputs deposits and operating expenses 
excluding personnel. The approach followed here is similar to Denizer, Dinc and Tarimcilar (2000).    
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Figure 1 illustrates the average efficiency of banks relative to the frontier in the production (first) stage, 
over the period 1992-1999. The average efficiency of the banking sector relative to the frontier declined from 
95 (percent) in 1992 to 87 in 1995, and more gradually to 83 in 1999. In contrast, there is a particularly sharp 
decline in foreign bank efficiency (from 98 in 1994 to 49 in 1999) over this last period. 
Figure 2 illustrates the average efficiency of banks relative to the frontier in the intermediation (second) 
stage. Between 1992 and 1995 average efficiency declines around 10 points to 84 for the full set of banks, then 
rises and falls to settle at 86 in 1999. This largely reflects trends in efficiency among domestic banks. In the 
case of foreign banks, efficiency rises from nearly 78 in 1995 to nearly 100 in 1999 (as noted earlier, this set of 
banks is small, and accounts for no more than 2 percent of total assets in our sample). 
Our DEA analysis thus yields two interesting results: First, banking efficiency in the production of deposits 
or the intermediation of loans declined prior to the liberalization of foreign bank entry in 1994. Second, no 
strong improvement in domestic bank efficiency in deposit nor loan production occurred after entry was 
liberalized. The decline in efficiency prior to foreign bank entry liberalization is consistent with the predictions 
of models that indicate that lack of competition will have incentive effects that adversely affect firm 
performance. Our theoretical framework suggests that declining efficiency may have contributed to lessened 
political pressure against liberalization in the first half of the 1990s. Finally, the modest improvements in 
banking efficiency in 1995 suggests that liberalization of entry was too restrictive to generate a competitive 
enough environment to offset these adverse incentive effects. 
A number of caveats to this interpretation are warranted. First, due to lack of data, we cannot compare our 
results with the behavior of efficiency prior to the early 1990s. Such a comparison would shed further light on 
the plausibility of the interpretation offered in this paper.  
Second, efficiency measures may be affected by temporary or cyclical factors, such as the East Asian 
financial crisis. However, average production or intermediation efficiency in domestic banks was higher in 
1998, at the peak of the crisis, than in 1999, when the economy was recovering, so it is not clear that this factor 
was dominant. 
Third, the trends in efficiency may reflect the fact that domestic banks are shifting to fee-based businesses 
that rely less on deposits. To shed further light on this, we break down the efficiency scores according to 
whether banks are “expanded” (universal banks, which rely less on deposits) or non-expanded (traditional 
commercial banks). The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. There is no clear pattern for the production stage, 
but in recent years the average efficiency scores for non-expanded banks appear to fall below those for 
expanded banks. The trends in efficiency in the expanded banks broadly conform to the results for the full 
sample of banks—declines in efficiency up to the mid-1990s, and modest or no improvements subsequently.  
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This is not what we would expect if the declining efficiency reflects the fact that banks are shifting away from 
traditional commercial banking.    
Another perspective on efficiency is provided by examining the share of banks in the production frontier. 
Figure 5 illustrates the shares for the deposit production and intermediation stages respectively. For the 
production stage the share of banks on the frontier fell from 43 percent in 1994 to 21 percent in 1999. Over the 
same period, the share of banks on the frontier in the intermediation stage increased from 17 percent to 21 
percent, but 2 of the 5 banks on the frontier are actually foreign, compared to 1 out of 4 in 1994. Overall, the 
entry of foreign banks has not encouraged more domestic banks to move to the frontier. 
The DEA analysis is based on the estimation of the production frontier for a given year, and the relative 
efficiency of banks relative to that frontier. It therefore does not explicitly compare bank efficiency in one year 
to bank efficiency in another year. To shed light on this question, we pooled the banks in 1994 (before the 
liberalization of foreign bank entry became effective) and 1999. We then identify the number of banks in the 
frontier and the year they belong to, as well as the average efficiency score for each year (1994 and 1999 
respectively). To test the robustness of the results we also pooled 1998 with 1994. The results are reported in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Banks on Frontier and Average Efficiency  
Pooled Sample 1994-1999 
  Pooled 1994-1999  Pooled 1994-1998 
  1994  1999    1994  1998 
  Stage 1           
Frontier (No. bks)  7  4    10  4 
  Average  85  80    91  81 
             
Stage 2           
Frontier (No. bks)  2  3    1  4 
Average  79  84    72  87 
   
The results for 1994-1999 show that for the production stage, fewer banks were on the frontier in 1999. 
Average efficiency for banks in that year is also lower, 80 compared to 85 in 1994. In contrast, there is some 
improvement in the intermediation stage. More banks were on the frontier in 1999 (3 banks, of which 2 are 
foreign) than in 1994 (2 banks) and average efficiency of the 1999 group (84) is  higher than the 1994 group 
(79). In this case, the evidence is mixed that the liberalization of foreign bank entry encouraged greater 
efficiency among domestic banks, in terms of placement on the frontier, or average position relative to the 
frontier.         
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4.2 Related findings     
Our finding of modest or mixed efficiency gains from foreign bank entry is consistent with the mixed 
results obtained in other studies. For example, in a cross-country study Claaesens, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1998) find that foreign bank entry leads to a decrease in domestic bank profitability, banks’ non-
interest income, and bank overall expenses, but only when entry is measured by the share of foreign banks in 
the total number of banks rather than their share in the assets of the banking system. (See also Claassens and 
Glaesner, 1998.)  Using DEA methods, Denizer, Dinc and Tarimcilar (2000) find that financial liberalization 
in Turkey (including foreign bank entry) led to a slight improvement in efficiency of domestic banks in 
intermediation,  but no improvement in deposit production. Leightner and Knox Lovell (1998 ) find that 
financial liberalization in Thailand in the early 1990s led to phenomenal (but declining) growth in commercial 
bank profits. Moreover, they find total factor productivity of Thai banks declined, while that of foreign banks 
increased. They infer that the large profits and decreasing productivity reflected Thai banks’ increasingly risky 
behavior as they anticipated lower profits in the near future due to liberalization. In a study of Thai finance and 
securities companies during the same period, Leightner (1999) obtains similar results. Thus existing research 
suggests that financial liberalization is not always followed by improvements in domestic bank efficiency. 
5.  Conclusions 
We have discussed how changes in political and economic factors may influence the timing and scope of 
financial liberalization by affecting a political equilibrium of competing interests. In particular, losses in 
efficiency or economic distortions associated with a non-competitive banking environment may impose such a 
high cost that they weaken the pressure against liberalization. We have also shown that while the new political 
equilibrium may lead to the adoption of economic reforms, there is no guarantee that these will be sufficiently 
wide-ranging to enhance competitiveness or improve efficiency.  
All these features are illustrated by the Philippine experience. Up to the early 1990s, the political 
equilibrium had prevented the entry of new foreign banks. The election of a president who aggressively 
pursued economic reforms and a distinct decline in banking efficiency prior to the adoption of reforms 
appeared to produce a consensus favoring the liberalization of foreign bank entry. However, the scope of 
liberalization of the Philippine banking sector was limited, and its effects on competitiveness or efficiency were 
modest.  
These results illustrate the impact of political economy factors on the pace of liberalization and amount of 
efficiency gains in the short run. They suggest that the mixed results yielded by studies of the efficiency effects 
of financial liberalization may be due to limited liberalization. However, our theoretical discussion also 
suggests that if lack of competition produces continued deterioration in efficiency, there will be a tendency for 
the scope of liberalization to increase over time. 
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